Last fall’s Polish parliamentary elections might be seen in hindsight as a geopolitical game-changer due to them removing the only obstacle that stood in the path to Germany’s US-backed rise as a global power in the New Cold War.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s trip to Kiev this week saw the completion of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement that began after his return to power late last year following the worst-ever crisis in their post-World War II ties that climaxed just prior. He declared that Ukraine is fighting on the side of “good” against “evil”, signed the G7 security pledge for that country, announced the joint production of ammo and arms on Ukrainian territory, and implied that it’ll be partially financed through a loan.
It was earlier assessed that “Tusk’s Return To Power In Poland Might Be Good News For Russia If He Does Germany’s Bidding” by aiding a Russian-German rapprochement like before unless “Germany decides to exploit its newly restored hegemony over Poland to become a global power at Russia’s expense. In that event, Germany might advise Tusk to retain PiS’ military buildup plans in order to use that country as its eastern bulwark against Russia and for needling it in Belarus, Kaliningrad, and/or Ukraine via hybrid war means.”
The aforementioned scenario is presently unfolding as a result of Tusk’s trip to Kiev, which comes against the backdrop of Germany rebuilding “Fortress Europe” to assist the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia”, which is being accelerated by the “military Schengen” proposal and the newly announced “Baltic Defense Line” The three preceding hyperlinked analyses detail these complex dynamics, but they can be summarized as the US supporting Germany’s rise as a global power in order to contain Russia in Europe by proxy.
In the lead-up to Tusk’s return, who opposition leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski accused of being a “German agent”, Germany ramped up its previous regional competition with Poland by extending military patronage to Ukraine and was accused by his predecessor of cutting a deal with it behind Poland’s back. While the latest moves might be interpreted by some as suggesting that Poland is still competing with Germany for influence there, the reality is that it’s actually serving Germany’s hegemonic ambitions.
To explain, Germany is unable to contain Russia in Europe by itself and therefore requires a reliable junior partner to help it with this, ergo the role that Poland is tasked to play in Berlin’s modern-day “Mitteleuropa”. Back when the conservative-nationalist opposition was in power, Poland wanted the “Three Seas Initiative” that it sought to lead to fulfill that function instead of Germany, but both will now be subordinated to Berlin and help share the financial-physical burden of containing Russia.
Germany’s support of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement and the EU’s impending release of €76 billion in funds to Warsaw that were frozen as punishment for the previous government’s pro-sovereignty judicial reforms serve as proof of these plans. President Andrzej Duda, who’ll remain in office until next year’s elections and hails from the conservative-nationalist opposition, described the withholding of those funds as a plot to change the Polish government that was confirmed by recent events.
Tusk has plunged Poland into is worst-ever crisis since the 1980s through the authoritarian means that he’s employed for imposing liberal–globalism onto his traditionally conservative-nationalist country, but he’s tried distracting from this by recently appealing to Polish patriots to support Ukraine. The EU is rewarding him by promising the release of those frozen funds while Biden praised his return to power as “very good” despite his methods violating Western standards of democracy and the rule of law.
The forthcoming influx of funds could lead to Tusk redirecting previously allocated ones from the budget towards Ukrainian-related endeavors such as the loan that he promised to extend, the joint production of ammo and arms, and infrastructure projects in the western part of that country. This outcome would enable Poland to continue playing its envisaged “big brother” role in Ukraine, albeit this time under strict German supervision in order to serve its hegemonic ambitions instead of thwart them.
Germany can then focus on implementing the “military Schengen” proposal for optimizing the movement of equipment and forces all along the “Baltic Defense Line” that’s expected to eventually stretch south for connecting to Poland’s border fence with Belarus in creating a unified barrier system. These fortifications might even go as far northward as the Arctic if Finland gets involved, in which case the length of the German-Russian front would approach the Nazi-Soviet one on the eve of World War II.
This observation highlights how fundamentally the European security architecture has changed since the start of Russia’s special operation and illustrates how the US could have Germany contain Russia in Europe by proxy through these means. Poland’s subordination to Germany is crucial to the success of the latter’s hegemonic ambitions since Berlin wouldn’t have a chance to accomplish any of this without Warsaw’s participation in the “military Schengen” and its new German-approved role in Ukraine.
Had Tusk never returned to power, then Poland’s conservative-nationalist government would have kept Germany in check, which would have been better for everyone by keeping the risk of a conflict by miscalculation with Russia much lower than it’s now soon poised to become. Last fall’s parliamentary elections might therefore be seen in hindsight as a geopolitical game-changer due to them removing the only obstacle that stood in the path to Germany’s US-backed rise as a global power in the New Cold War.